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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Kirsten Spier-Turner appeals from the judgment of the district court entered upon the jury
verdict finding her guilty of possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug
paraphernalia. On appeal Spier-Turner argues that the district court erred when it denied her
motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Idaho State Police executed a search warrant for a residence located in Post Falls.
(3/14/17 Tr., p. 7, L. 6 – p.12, L. 6; see also R., pp. 9-10.) The police knocked and announced,
waited thirty seconds and then breached the door using a large metal ram. (Id.) Several people
were located and removed from the house, including Spier-Turner. (Id.) Spier-Turner exited the
residence with a purse over her shoulder. (3/14/17 Tr., p. 12, Ls. 7-24, p. 28, Ls. 7-18.) As is
common practice, Detective Scotch handcuffed Spier-Turner while they executed the search
warrant. (3/14/17 Tr., p. 12, L. 7 – p. 17, L. 5.) The purse stayed on her shoulder while she was
handcuffed and seated on the curb. (Id.) After about 40 minutes, Detective Scotch removed the
purse from Spier-Turner’s shoulder. (Id.) The purse was placed next to where she was sitting.
(Id.)
Detective Klitch read Spier-Turner Miranda warnings. (3/14/17 Tr., p. 17, L. 25 – p. 19,
L. 1, p. 21, L. 23 – p. 22, L. 9.) Detective Scotch moved Spier-Turner away from the curb and
interviewed her near the driveway. (Id.) Spier-Turner said she had been “couch hopping” and
had lived at the residence “on and off for the past couple days[.]” (Id.) Spier-Turner told
Detective Scotch that she had a marijuana pipe in her bra. (Id.) After this interview Spier-Turner
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was brought back to her spot on the curb. (3/14/17 Tr., p. 19, L. 2 – p. 20, L. 15.) Spier-Turner
was still in handcuffs. (Id.)
Detective Scotch told Detective Adams that Spier-Turner had admitted to having a
marijuana pipe in her bra. (3/14/17 Tr., p. 20, L. 20 – p. 21, L. 6.) Detective Adams removed
Spier-Turner’s handcuffs and had Spier-Turner remove the marijuana pipe from her bra.
(3/14/17 Tr., p. 27, L. 16 – p. 28, L. 6.)
Detective Adams arrested Spier-Turner for possession of the marijuana pipe. (3/14/17
Tr., p. 30, L. 23 – p. 33, L. 1.) Spier-Turner was transported to the police station. (Id.) The
purse remained on scene. (Id.) Sergeant Van Leuven and Detective Adams searched the purse
and found plastic baggies with white crystal residue, a tourniquet and multiple hypodermic
needles. (3/14/17 Tr., p. 36, L. 6 – p. 37, L. 13.) The state charged Spier-Turner with possession
of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp. 37-38.)
Spier-Turner filed a motion to suppress arguing that the search of her purse was unlawful.
(R., pp. 32-33, 42-50.) The state responded. (R., pp. 54-62.) The district court held a hearing on
Spier-Turner’s motion to suppress. (R., pp. 63-68.)
The state argued that Spier-Turner was subject to search pursuant to the search warrant.
(3/14/17 Tr., p. 5, L. 14 – p. 6, L. 16.) The district court disagreed and held that because the
warrant was not specifically for Spier-Turner’s person the search warrant did not apply to her and
thus the burden was on the state to show an exception to the warrant requirement.

(Id.)

Detective Scotch testified that when Spier-Turner admitted to having the marijuana pipe in her
bra, she was still in handcuffs and her purse was about 20 to 25 feet away. (3/14/17 Tr., p. 21, L.
23 – p. 22, L. 11, p. 24, Ls. 1-8.) Detective Adams testified that under standard operating
procedure, Spier-Turner’s purse would have been transported to the jail with her. (3/14/17 Tr., p.
2

30, L. 23 – p. 33, L. 1.) However, because it was a dynamic situation with a lot going on, the
purse was not transported with her. (Id.) The purse was set aside. (Id.) It was very cold outside
and the police did not let people back inside the house that was being searched pursuant to the
search warrant. (Id.) Spier-Turner was transported to the police station and her purse was left on
scene and searched later. (Id.)
The district court denied the motion to suppress. (3/14/17 Tr., p. 60, L. 18 – p. 63, L. 6.)
The district court held that because she did not have the search warrant “in front of [her]” that
she did not know what the scope of the search warrant was and thus could not say whether SpierTurner was subject to search under the search warrant. (Id.) The district court found that when
Spier-Turner admitted to possessing the marijuana pipe in her bra, the police had probable cause
to arrest her. (Id.) The district court found the search of the purse was valid under both the
search incident to arrest exception and the inventory exception to the warrant requirement. 1 (Id.)
The court held that, because the purse could have been searched as part of any booking procedure
into the jail, it did not offend the Fourth Amendment to search that purse at the scene. (Id.)
The case proceeded to jury trial. (R., pp. 101-112.) The jury found Spier-Turner guilty of
possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., p. 112; 7/18/17 Tr.,
p. 206, Ls. 2-19.) The district court entered judgment and sentenced Spier-Turner to three years
and six months with one year and six months fixed. (R., pp. 148-152.) The district court

1

Although the district court did not use the words “inventory exception,” it is clear from its
reasoning and from the case law upon which it relied, that it found the search was authorized
under the inventory exception because it was conducted as part of routine administrative
procedure incident to incarceration.
3

suspended execution of the sentence and placed Spier-Turner on probation. (Id.) Spier-Turner
timely appealed. (R., pp. 156-159.)

4

ISSUE
Spier-Turner states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Spier-Turner’s motion to suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 8.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Spier-Turner failed to show the district court erred when it denied her motion to
suppress?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Spier-Turner’s Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
After Spier-Turner admitted to having a marijuana pipe in her bra, and after the police

had retrieved the marijuana pipe, the police arrested Spier-Turner and transported her to the jail.
(See 3/14/17 Tr., p. 20, L. 20 – p. 21, L. 6, p. 27, L. 16 – p. 28, L. 6, p. 30, L. 23 – p. 33, L. 1.)
Spier-Turner’s purse was later searched. (Id.) The district court held the search of the purse fell
under both the search incident to arrest and inventory search exceptions to the warrant
requirement. (3/14/17 Tr., p. 60, L. 18 – p. 63, L. 6.) On appeal, Spier-Turner argues the district
court erred. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 9-16.) She argues both that the purse was not within her
immediate vicinity and thus did not fall within the scope of a lawful search incident to arrest and
that because the purse was not transported to the jail with her, and was searched on scene, it was
not a proper inventory search. (See id.) On appeal, this Court need not reach the search incident
to arrest exception, and the respondent will submit on that issue, because the search was valid
under the inventory exception. Spier-Turner was lawfully placed in custody and taken to jail;
therefore, the police could properly search her purse pursuant to the inventory search exception.

B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, the appellate

court applies a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d
182, 183 (2009) (citing State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005)). The
appellate court defers to the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous;
however, the appellate court freely reviews the determination as to whether constitutional
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requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Hansen, 151 Idaho 342, 345,
256 P.3d 750, 753 (2011) (citing State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 485, 163 P.3d 1194, 1197
(2007)).

C.

Spier-Turner Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Denied Her Motion
To Suppress
The district court denied Spier-Turner’s motion to suppress. (3/14/17 Tr., p. 60, L. 18 –

p. 63, L. 6.) The district court found that the warrantless search of the purse was valid under both
the search incident to arrest exception and the inventory exception. (See id.) On appeal, SpierTurner argues that the search incident to arrest exception does not apply because she claims the
district court clearly erred when it made the factual finding that the purse was within SpierTurner’s immediate control when she told Officer Scotch about the marijuana pipe.

(See

Appellant’s brief, p. 13.) She also argues that the inventory exception does not apply because the
purse was not searched at the actual jailhouse. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-15.) Spier-Turner
has failed to show the district court erred when it denied her motion to suppress. Because the
search of the purse was clearly allowable under the well-established inventory exception to the
warrant requirement, the respondent will focus its argument on that exception and submit on the
district court’s finding of a valid search under the search incident to arrest exception.

1.

The District Court Properly Found That Spier-Turner’s Purse Could Be Searched
Pursuant To The Well-Established Inventory Exception To The Warrant
Requirement

The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. “A warrantless
search is presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain special and well-delineated
exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 873, 11 P.3d 489, 492
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(Ct. App. 2000) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455 (1971); State v.
Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999)). “Inventory searches are a
well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.” State v.
Stewart, 152 Idaho 868, 870, 276 P.3d 740, 742 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479
U.S. 367, 371 (1987); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643 (1983); State v. Owen, 143 Idaho
274, 277, 141 P.3d 1143, 1146 (Ct. App. 2006). “The legitimate purposes of inventory searches
are: (1) protect the owner’s property while it remains in police custody; (2) protect the State
against false claims of lost or stolen property; and (3) protect police from potential danger.” Id.
(citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369-370 (1976)). “However, an inventory
search must not be a ruse for general rummaging in order to locate incriminating evidence.” Id.
(citing Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 3 (1990)). “‘Inventory searches, when conducted in
compliance with standard and established police procedures and not as a pretext for criminal
investigation, do not offend Fourth Amendment strictures against unreasonable searches and
seizures.’” Id. (quoting State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290, 900 P.2d 196, 198 (1995)).
In State v. Slaybaugh, Slaybaugh was arrested on a charge of driving under the influence.
State v. Slaybaugh, 108 Idaho 551, 552, 700 P.2d 954, 955 (Ct. App. 1985). When Slaybaugh
arrived at the jail her purse, which officers had retrieved from the passenger seat of Slaybaugh’s
car, was given to the jailer. Id. The jailer inventoried Slaybaugh’s purse. Id. When searching
the purse the jailer saw a “small, black coin purse.” Id. The jailer handed the coin purse to the
arresting officer to “look at.” Id. The arresting officer found cocaine. Id. Slaybaugh was
charged with, among other things, possession of cocaine.

Id.

The district court granted

Slaybaugh’s motion to suppress, finding that the “warrantless search and seizure did not result
from a search incident to arrest and that the seizure could not be justified as an inventory search
8

because the purse could have been secured or held in safekeeping by the police without ever
viewing or cataloging the contents of the purse.” Id. at 552-553, 700 P.2d at 955-956. The Idaho
Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s suppression order. Id. at 553-554, 700 P.2d at 956957. The Idaho Court of Appeals noted that it is reasonable for the police to examine an
accused’s personal effects when the accused is in lawful custody as a result of a lawful arrest.
See id. at 554, 700 P.2d at 957.
[I]t is difficult to perceive what is unreasonable about the police examining and
holding as evidence those personal effects of the accused that they already have in
their lawful custody as the result of a lawful arrest.
Id. (quoting United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 806 (1974)); see also State v. Calegar, 104
Idaho 526, 661 P.2d 311 (1983). Further, “it was reasonable for police, as a part of the routine
administrative procedure incident to incarcerating an arrested person, to search any container or
article in his possession, in accordance with established inventory procedures.” Id. (citing
Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 645-649 (1983)). The Idaho Court of Appeals concluded that
it was reasonable to take Slaybaugh’s purse to the jail and search it as part of the routine booking
procedures. Id.
Here, the district court relied, in part, upon Slaybaugh when it denied Spier-Turner’s
motion to suppress:
However, there’s Idaho case law on point, the Slaybaugh case, 108 Idaho
551, which indicates that in circumstances strikingly familiar to those at bar in this
case, the purse was seized from the front seat of the vehicle, taken to the jail, the
jail – the purse was searched after the defendant was booked, and the contents of
the purse were searched without a warrant. That produced cocaine.
And the Court – the holding in the Slaybaugh case was, “It was reasonable
for the police, as part of the routine administrative procedure incident to
incarcerating an arrested person, to search any container or article in his
possession in connection with established procedure.”
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Here, there’s no question Detective Adams could have searched the purse
at the time she was arrested. Had the officer taken the purse to the Public Safety
Building, it could have been searched as part of the booking procedure. The only
question is whether the officers may search the purse at the location of the arrest
based upon the above case law.
The Court finds that a search is valid which is conducted at the place – had
it been conducted at the place of arrest, it’s also valid when conducted later. The
purse would have been subject to search at the place and time of her arrest. It
could have been searched also at the jail. It was searched, the purse, at the place
of arrest after the defendant was removed, and that does not offend the Fourth
Amendment.
(3/14/17 Tr., p. 61, L. 23 – p. 63, L. 2.)
Spier-Turner argues her case is distinguishable from the inventory search cases because
“Ms. Spier-Turner’s purse did not accompany her to the jail, and was not searched pursuant to
the jail’s administrative booking procedure.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-15 (citing Tr., generally)
(emphasis original).) Both of these distinguishing features are irrelevant.
First, the rationale behind an inventory search does not require that the item accompany
the arrested defendant to the actual jail. “The legitimate purposes of inventory searches are: (1)
protect the owner’s property while it remains in police custody; (2) protect the State against false
claims of lost or stolen property; and (3) protect police from potential danger.” Stewart, 152
Idaho at 870, 276 P.3d at 742 (citations omitted). None of these rationales requires the owner’s
property be actually transported to the jail or police station before it can be searched. Once there
is a lawful arrest and the defendant is placed in lawful custody it is legal for the officers to
conduct an inventory search of the defendant’s belongings that are in their custody.
The untenable nature of Spier-Turner’s proposed “stationhouse” requirement is
highlighted when inventory searches of automobiles are considered.

Inventory searches of

automobiles regularly occur before the vehicle is towed or transported. See, e.g., Stewart, 152

10

Idaho at 869, 276 P.3d 740 (before tow truck arrived the officer performed an inventory search of
the vehicle); State v. Smith, 120 Idaho 77, 80, 813 P.2d 888, 891 (1991) (under Idaho law it was
permissible for the police to search the defendant’s car once the decision was made to impound);
State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 795, 69 P.3d 1052, 1056 (2003) (“After conducting an inventory
search of [arrested defendant’s] vehicle, [the officer] returned to the patrol car and asked
[arrested defendant] who he would like to tow his vehicle.”). There is no requirement that the
person’s effects, or automobile, actually be physically present in the police station before a
legitimate inventory search can occur.
Next, Spier-Turner argues that this was not a lawful inventory search of her purse because
it was not searched pursuant to booking procedures. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-15.) First, an
inventory search that does not comply with department polices is not necessarily an unreasonable
search. Stewart, 152 Idaho at 872 n. 1, 276 P.3d at 744 n.1 (“Noncompliance with department
policies does not necessarily translate into a search that is unreasonable per se.”). However, here
the detention deputy testified that when female arrestees are taken into the jail, their purses are
always searched. (3/14/17 Tr., p. 44, L. 19 – p. 46, L. 10.) Detective Adams testified that under
standard operating procedure, Spier-Turner’s purse would have been transported to the jail with
her, but because it was a dynamic situation with a lot going on, the purse was not transported
with her. (3/14/17 Tr., p. 30, L. 23 – p. 33, L. 1.) Spier-Turner was transported to the police
station and her purse was left on scene and searched later. (Id.) Usually purses are transported to
the jail with the arrested defendant because “that’s her property, and for liability purposes we
generally don’t release it to anybody else, to make sure that none of her property goes missing.”
(Id.) Spier-Turner’s purse was in police custody and the legitimate purposes of an inventory
search include protecting her property and protecting the State against false claims of lost or
11

stolen property. See Stewart, 152 Idaho at 870, 276 P.3d at 742. As a result it was reasonable
for the police to inventory her purse, regardless of the physical location of the purse when they
made the inventory. The district court did not err when it held the police’s search of the purse
was a valid inventory search.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 5th day of September, 2018.

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of September, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means
of iCourt File and Serve:
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Ted S. Tollefson
TED S. TOLLEFSON
Deputy Attorney General
TST/dd

12

